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Wherever law ends, tyranny begins, if the law be transgressed to another's
harm; and whosoever in authority exceeds the power given him by the law,
and makes use of the force he has under his command to compass that upon
the subject which the law allows not, ceases in that to be a magistrate, and
acting without authority may be opposed, as any other man who by force

invades the right of another.-JoHN Locxx'

THE

great John L. Lewis case is history. Lawyers and judges, students and scholars, labor leaders and corporation executives will
read it and study it, praise it and damn it, cite it and miscite it,
apply it and distinguish it. For the John L. Lewis case is now a lengthy
set of opinions delivered by the Justices of the United States Supreme
Court, an historical document gathering dust on many shelves. But it is
more than this. As a social force of incalculable potential it affects and will
continue to affect the lives of millions of people in this country and
throughout the world. Whatever it means and may be found to mean,
people must live with it, knowing that as law itwill ever gain new meaning.
No matter how long it lies unused, or how often used only to be gently
distinguished,2 until laid finally to rest by its creators it will remain a
force-explosive ammunition for future social combat.
United States v. United Mine Workers of Americas may collapse as
quickly as the Gobitis4 opinion, the conscience of judges giving expression
to saner views when the crisis of the moment is over. Or become another
Swift v. Tyson,5 shaping the law through a century of "error." An "unprecedented situation," though, it may end in near oblivion-with
Crowell v. Benson,6 a judicial aberration filed and willingly forgotten. Or
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the concurring opinion of Rutledge, J., in Penfield Co. of California v. SEC, 67 S. Ct.
918, 927 (I947), in which he finds the Court's handling of the civil-criminal contempt distinction in that case difficult to reconcile "with what was done in the Mine Workers decision."
2See
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4Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (2940), overruled in West Virginia
State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
S 16 Pet. (U.S.) 1 (1842), overruled in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 3o4 U.S. 64 (1938).
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like Dred Scott7 it may help foment the very strife violently to overrule it.
The history of the John L. Lewis case lies ahead.
Mr. Justice Murphy in dissent warns that its implications "cast a dark
cloud over the future of labor relations in the United States.' ' They may
be even more fearsome. Both the result and the methods of reaching that
result must give us pause, to reflect not alone on the future of labor relations but on the future of democratic government itself. The sovereign in
its wrath has broken a strike. In so doing it has disregarded and has
persuaded its judges to disregard the "text, context, content and historical
setting" 9 of a statute, one of the most important of generations, the
"culmination of a bitter political, social and economic controversy.''*°
Not without cause did John L. Lewis describe the result in the lower court
as the "ugly recrudescence of 'government by injunction.' "" But more,
the justices have sired a doctrine-a rule of law, if you will-which can
best be described as the doctrine that "the Court can do no wrong."
Given the role of courts in the American constitutional system and the
dynamics of a highly unstable social order, this doctrine may prove to be
a judicial formula for repression and reaction.
And it is well to recognize at the outset that we are not here dealing
with a skirmish in isolation. The clash between Lewis and the government
is part of a greater struggle-a battle which now has reached the stage of
an all-out assault upon the trade union movement. The leaders of that
attack are eager to restore to the federal courts some or all of the injunction power exercised so effectively against labor for forty years. In May
of 1946, at the time of the railway strike, President Truman proposed to
Congress a Temporary Industrial Disputes Settlement Act which would
have authorized, where the government had taken possession of the
plant or industry involved, the issuance of an injunction at the petition
of the Attorney General.12 Passed by the House, this proposal died in the
Senate. Six months later the government asserted against John L. Lewis
the right to injunctive relief without specific legislative authority, a sudden about-face which perhaps reveals too much as to the legal thought
processes of the Truman administration. The proposal of last May at least
7Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. (U.S.) 393 (1857).
8

United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 67 S.Ct. 677, 717 (1947). Reference
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9 Frankfurter, J., at 706.
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had this obvious merit-it urged the Congress to change the law and not
the courts to flout it.
The Congress now has before it numerous proposals which would reintroduce under varying circumstances the labor injunction. Whatever
some of the participants and judges may have thought, the decision in the
Lewis case has not abated these insistent demands that the NorrisLaGuardia Act be scrapped or emasculated. Rather it would seem to have
reassured the Congress, to have encouraged it in the adoption of ever more
drastic means. The Lewis decision is the first breakthrough of this offensive-a salient pointing directly at the heart of labor's rights. It is
strange-no, frightening-in an economy already beginning to stagger
from uncontrolled prices and exorbitant profits, to see the Executive, the
Congress, and the courts join together to shackle the economic strength
of the millions, whose purchasing power alone can save the structure from
a dizzy fall.
Perhaps no case of recent times has so stripped bare the working of law
in acquisitive society. The sharpness of the conflict, its world-wide repercussions, the pressures for its resolution, and the narrow and technical
legal points to be decided-here was drama and an opportunity for men
and judges to "live greatly in the law.' 3 But hysteria and political expediency triumphed. Precedents were misread, statutes abused or disregarded, settled legal principles ignored, procedural safeguards abandoned.
The Court then set about the task of trying to show that nothing of the
sort had happened-that the path of the law was not strewn with the
tortured remains of principle and procedure. In thus "vindicating the
process of law,"* Mr. Justice Frankfurter and his colleagues, it would
seem, were vivisecting it.
I
A community whose judges would be willing to give it whatever law might
gratify the impulse of the moment would find in the end that it had paid too
high a price for relieving itself of the bother of awaiting a session of the Legislature and the enactment of a statute in accordance with established forms.
-CAPDOZO, J."

The beginning was a dispute in contract. From there the controversy
quickly spread to graver matters, the original issue being all but lost in
the m~l~e. In the final test of battle, "the fight for mastery in ....the
XSOliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., quoted in Lerner, The Mind and Faith of justice Holmes .3
('943).
14Frankfurter, J., at 705.
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court,"' 6 the sovereign won, and those who had failed to heed its command'were punished. The point of contract, though, is yet unsettled, and
the labor dispute which gave the contract birth, still unresolved.
In the spring of 1946, in the face of a dispute between the miners and
the mine operators, the President, "to insure the operation of [the] mines
....

and to preserve the national economic structure in the present

emergency," authorized government seizure of the mines.' 7 The Secretary
of the Interior, as operator of the mines under the President's order,
negotiated an agreement with the United Mine Workers to cover "for
the period of Government possession the terms and conditions of employment ...... " This was the famous Krug-Lewis Agreement of May 29,
i946.18

At various times in the ensuing months, the United Mine Workers complained that the government had not observed its agreement. On October
21 Lewis wrote to Secretary Krug stating that the government's "unilateral misinterpretations" constituted a breach of the Krug-Lewis Agreement and characterizing the government's position as one of "adamant
refusal to correct these errors." Lewis thereupon requested a "joint conference ....

for the purpose of negotiating new arrangements affecting

wages, hours, rules, practices .... and all other pertinent matters.
.... ."'9 Such a conference, according to Lewis, could be called by either
party under Section I5 of the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of April 11, I945, . o the terms of which had been carried forward and

preserved by the Krug-Lewis Agreement "except as amended and supplemented" therein.21 Section 15 provided that either party might give "ten
days' notice in writing of a desire for a negotiating conference," which the
other party agreed to attend. "At the end of fifteen days after the beginning of such negotiating conference" either party might serve "notice
in writing of the termination of this Agreement, to be effective five days
after the receipt of such notice."To these contentions Coal Mines Administrator Collisson replied, denying any breach of the Krug-Lewis Agreement by the government and
asserting that the demand for a conference was unwarranted, since Section 15 of the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement had been superseded by the Krug-Lewis Agreement, which by its explicit terms was ef16 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., quoted in Lerner, op. cit. supra note 13, at 39.
17Executive Order 9728, ii Fed. Register 5593 (1946).
18
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9 Ibid., at 26-27.
2, Ibid., at i8.
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fective for "the period of Government possession." The Administrator
urged that any negotiating conferences for a new agreement "be had with
'
the representatives of the owners of such mines.
Lewis countered with a telegram to Secretary Krug insisting that the
Krug-Lewis Agreement expressly bound the parties to meet upon the request of either party. He warned that failure "to honor this meeting will
constitute another breach of the contract, and will void the Krug-Lewis
Agreement. ' ' 24 Secretary Krug, at that time absent from Washington,
requested Lewis by wire to meet with Coal Mines Administrator Collisson
on November i or any other agreeable date. 2 Lewis promptly accepted,
stating that he esteemed Krug's telegram as compliance with his original
123

request of October

21

.26

Meetings between representatives of the United Mine Workers and the
Coal Mines Administrator began on November i without prejudice to the
conflicting claims of the parties as to the continuing vitality of Section 15
of the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement. Secretary Krug returned to Washington in time to attend the fifth conference, on November
ii, apparently the first at which Lewis presented specific demands as to
wages, hours, and other conditions. Further meetings were held on
November 13 and 14, with Secretary Krug trying to persuade Lewis "to
sit down at once with the operators," and Lewis reminding the govern27
ment that under Section 15 time was "running out.'
certain of
On November 14, Secretary Krug wrote to Lewis: " ....
your proposals are of such a fundamental nature that they should be directed to the owners and private operators of the bituminous coal mines
rather than to the Government, which is only the interim custodian of
these properties. '8 He then outlined a proposal for negotiations between
the operators and the United Mine Workers, to begin on November i6,
looking toward a new agreement and the return of the mines to private
operation within a period of two months. The Attorney General, he advised Lewis, had officially concurred in the government's interpretation
of the Krug-Lewis Agreement.2 9 With regard to Section 15 of the National
Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement, relied upon by Lewis in demanding
the conference, the Attorney General had written: "In my opinion the
provision ....is no longer in force."' 3
On the following day, November 15, in reply to Secretary Krug's
Ibid.,
T7 at 298, 222.
23 Ibid., at 27-29.
Ibid., at 29.
Ibid.
26Ibid., at 3o.
24

28Ibid., at 30.
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letter, which he referred to as "your ukase of yesterday," Lewis observed
that the Secretary had "graciously given" of-his time, "in full and private
conference, to the extent of three hours and fifty-eight minutes," and
condemned the proposal for a conference with the operators as "sheer
folly." He concluded by asserting that the mine workers did not propose
"to deal with parties who have no status" under the Krug-Lewis Agreement. 3' On that day, too, Lewis sent a second letter to Secretary Krug:
"Fifteen days having now elapsed since the beginning of said conference,
the United Mine Workers of America, exercising its option hereby terminates said Krug-Lewis Agreement as of 12:oo o'clock P.m., Midnight,
Wednesday, November 20, I946. ' 132 The Secretary replied: ". . . . you
have no power, under the Krug-Lewis Agreement of May 29 or under the
law, by unilateral declaration to terminate the contract which by its
terms 'covers for the period of Government possession the terms and
conditions of employment.' ,,33
Though tempers were short and language tart, the legal problem was
still one of contract. A neat one too and squarely put-the pity is we still
have had no answer.
Lewis meanwhile was distributing to the membership of the United
Mine Workers, for their "official information," copies of his letter to
34
Secretary Krug purporting to terminate the Krug-Lewis Agreement.
In accordance with the "no contract, no work" policy of the United Mine
Workers, a walkout commenced on November i8, quickly closing most of
the nation's bituminous coal mines.
On November i8, therefore, the government filed in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia a complaint asking for a
declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. 31 Without notice or hearing
and without entry of the findings which would have been required by the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, Judge Goldsborough issued a temporary order, restraining the United Mine Workers of America and John L. Lewis and
"their agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and all persons in active concert or participation with them .... pending further order of
this Court,"
from permitting to continue in effect the notice heretofore given by the defendant,
John L. Lewis, to the Secretary of Interior dated November I5, 1946; and from issuing
or otherwise giving publicity to any notice that or to the effect that the Krug-Lewis
Agreement has been, is, or will at some future date be terminated, or that said agree31Ibid., at 3o4.
3' Ibid., at 34.
33 Ibid., at 34-35.

34Ibid., at 284-85.
" Ibid., at i.
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ment is or shall at some future date be nugatory or void at any time during Government possession of the bituminous coal mines; and from breaching any of their obligations under said Krug-Lewis Agreement; and from coercing, instigating, inducing,
or encouraging the mine workers at the bituminous coal mines in the Government's
possession, or any of them, or any person, to interfere by strike, slow down, walkout,
cessation of work, or otherwise, with the operation of said mines by continuing in effect
the aforesaid notice or by issuing any notice of termination of agreement or through
any other means or device; and from interfering with or obstructing the exercise by
the Secretary of the Interior of his functions under Executive Order 9728; and from
taking any action which would interfere with this Court's jurisdiction or which would
impair, obstruct, or render fruitless, the determination of this case by the Court ..... 36

The temporary restraining order was to expire at 3: oo P-.M on November 27, the government's motion for a preliminary injunction being set for
hearing at Io:oo A.M. of the same day. Since the defendants took no
action to withdraw the termination notice, the government filed a petition
on November 21, together with an affidavit of the Coal Mines Administrator, for a rule to show cause why the defendants should not be adjudged
in contempt.37 The rule was issued, with November 25 as the return day
and November 27 as the day for trial if the contempt had not been
purged.38 On November 25 the defendants appeared in court to state that
they had "done no act nor spoken any word pertaining to said notice or in
9
reference to permitting it to continue in effect."1
On the following day the defendants moved to discharge the rule to
show cause, on the ground that the temporary restraining order was beyond the jurisdiction of the court in view of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
and in that it deprived defendants of their constitutional rights. They contended further that if the petition for a rule had for its object the institution of criminal contempt proceedings, the statutory requirements for
criminal contempt had not been met.40 After hearings on November 27
and 29, the court determined that the Norris-LaGuardia Act did not
apply and overruled the defendants' motion to discharge the rule.4' In
view of the time taken to dispose of this matter, there having yet been no
argument on the government's petition for a preliminary injunction, the
court, on the government's motion and over the strenuous protest of the
defendants, extended the temporary restraining order for an additional
42
ten days.
43
The defendants pleaded "not guilty" and waived an advisory jury.
36 Ibid.,
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Trial took place on November 29, December 2, and December 3. The
court found that the defendants United Mine Workers and John L. Lewis
had "committed" civil contempt and were "guilty" of criminal contempt,
having "wilfully, wrongfully and deliberately disobeyed and violated the
terms of the said temporary restraining order and ....
obstructed and'
44
interfered with the determination of this case by this Court."
On December 4, the Assistant Attorney General pointed to the "great
injury .... inflicted on the people of the United States by the action of
these defendants" and to the courts of law which had been established by
the "founders of this Republic" as a "constitutional safeguard .... basic
to our democratic form of government," urging that these two aspects of
the public interest be given consideration in imposing sentence. 45 judge
Goldsborough termed the act of the defendants "an evil, demoniac,
monstrous thing that means hunger and cold and unemployment and
destitution and disorganization of the social fabric; a threat to democratic
government itself" and "one of the most serious situations that has ever
developed in a republic. ' 46 He imposed fines of $io,ooo on John L. Lewis
and $3,500,000 on the United Mine Workers of America-the precise
7
amounts recommended by the government on the previous day4
The theory of the government's case--and of judge Goldsborough's
decision-must be distinguished from the position later taken by the
Supreme Court. In fact, with respect to the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the
Supreme Court adopted a view that had not even been argued. And much
that was argued at length was barely mentioned.
The government's theory was really quite simple, although its desire to
envelop the Norris-LaGuardia Act from all possible angles lent some impression of confusion. The government's petition asked for a declaratory
judgment determining whether or not the defendants had the right unilaterally to terminate the Krug-Lewis Agreement and also for injunctive
relief. On the theory that Lewis' letter purporting to terminate the agreement, which the defendants had circulated among the membership of the
United Mine Workers, really constituted a strike notice, the government
asked that the defendants be restrained from permitting this notice to
remain in effect. 48 The temporary restraining, order was thus "to prevent
49
irreparable injury to the interests of the people of the United States"
44

Ibid., at 99.

45 Ibid., at 320.

46 Ibid., at 328.

4' Ibid., at 329. judge Goldsborough also issued the preliminary injunction on December 4,
1946, in virtually the same terms as the temporary restraining order. Ibid., at 102.
48Ibid., at 8, 51-52.
49Ibid., at 56.
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and to protect the court's jurisdiction pending final determination of the
disputed contract question.
"The entire case," the government contended, "falls well outside the
area designed to be covered by the Norris-LaGuardia Act." 50 The controversy is not a labor dispute-rather it is a dispute as to the proper interpretation of the Krug-Lewis Agreement. Nor can the government as
sovereign be held "to be engaged in a labor dispute with private persons."' Moreover, the act itself does not in specific terms apply to the
government. Therefore a well-known canon of construction is applicable
to the effect that statutes in general terms which take away pre-existing
rights or privileges do not apply to the sovereign unless there are very
clear words to indicate such an intent. In this manner the government
disposed of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
Along with its request for temporary injunctive relief "pending a peaceful judicial determination of a disputed legal problem, 5 2 the government
urged the need for an injunction to restrain an unlawful act-breach of
the Krug-Lewis Agreement and violation of the War Labor Disputes
Act. The government also resurrected the case of In re Debs,5 3 asserting
that its basic doctrine was still valid and applicable, entitling the government to "judicial protection of its rights lawfully to exercise its sovereign
functions without interference and obstruction.1 5 4 Here, it urged, the
sovereign, in the exercise of the war power, had taken possession of and
was operating the coal mines. It now asked the court to prevent interference with the effective exercise of these "essential sovereign powers.""5
Now clearly, only the government could ask for equitable protection of
its sovereign functions. But the government's contention that it was
entitled to injunctive relief simply to preserve the status quo pending
judicial determination of the dispute over the terms of an agreement is an
argument that any private employer might make. If a disagreement over
the meaning of a contract does not constitute a labor dispute, then obviously an easy detour around the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
is at hand. The employer need only ask for a declaratory judgment, asserting that the parties have come to conflict over the meaning of an
agreement, and request a temporary restraining order maintaining the
subject-matter of the litigation pending the court's decision. Pushed by
so Ibid., at 57.
5' Ibid.
5 Ibid., at 56.
s3 158 U.S. 564 (1895). In its brief in the Supreme Court (at p.

22), the government described the Debs case as "the only analogous case ever considered by this Court."
'4

Record, at 55.

s2Ibid.
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Justices Jackson and Reed in oral argument before the Supreme Court,
Assistant Attorney General Sonnett rather lamely admitted as much,
though labelling the argument a "straw man" and saying that there was
s6
no need to reach it.
Nonetheless, Judge Goldsborough appears to have adopted the government's argument in toto. The Norris-LaGuardia Act, he ruled, did not
apply because it was not dearly intended to cover the government; consequently the canon of construction applied to protect the government's preexisting rights.5 7 To the defendants' arguments that the sweeping character of the restraining order deprived them of constitutional liberties and
imposed on the miners involuntary servitude, the court replied that it did
not "so understand the order"' 8 and that "the miners are not in this
case."5 9 The purpose of the order, the court said, was "to maintain the
status quo ..... What the Court was commanding was that this statement that the contract between the Union and the Government had expired should be rescinded, and that other matter in the order was simply
ancillary. 6° .... The Court does not think that the contention that freedom of speech has been violated is a matter for serious consideration."'"
In the course of the argument and in its memorandum, the government
contended that even if the Norris-LaGuardia Act did apply the defendants could still be punished for contempt in refusing to obey the
court's order. Should the defendants object that the court had no jurisdiction, "such an objection would at best be only an arguable contention
which would pose an issue for decision by the Court. Pending a decision
of that very issue, the Court was and is clearly empowered to protect its
jurisdiction to pass on the question! ' 62 Although by his ruling that the
Norris-LaGuardia Act was not applicable it became unnecessary for
Judge Goldsborough to pass on this contention, it was obvious that he was
in complete agreement, saying that no other rule "would accord with a
sound system of jurisprudence. ' 63 The court, he said, is "the judge of its
own jurisdiction," and if the defendants "disregarded entirely that restraining order then they are guilty of contempt of Court, whether the
Norris-LaGuardia Act applies or does not apply. That, in this Court's
64
opinion, is the law."
Judge Goldsborough disposed with equal dispatch of the defendants'
objections as to the adequacy of the means employed for initiating crimis6 Oral Argument, at 53.
s7 Record, at 2o3.

6, Ibid., at 204.

s Ibid., at 173.

62Ibid., at 76.

59 Ibid., at 178.
6
o Ibid., at 172, 204.

63Ibid., at 144.
6
4Ibid., at i44-45.

THE DIVINE RIGHT OF GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY

nal contempt proceedings. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure require that criminal contempt be prosecuted on notice, which notice must
"state the essential facts constituting the criminal contempt charged and
describe it as such."' s The government's petition for a rule to show cause
and the supporting affidavit of the Coal Mines Administrator failed to
meet this precise requirement. Nowhere were the proceedings being
instituted described as criminal contempt. judge Goldsborough held, however, that if it were "a mistake not to have charged that the contempt was
criminal specifically, it is not sufficient at all to vitiate the proceeding."'
An air of unreality emerges from the record of the District Court proceedings. Behind the polite pretense that the sole purpose of the injunction was to maintain the "status quo," the rambling discussions as to
whether or not the government was here performing a "sovereign function," the argument that this was no "labor dispute," and the assurances
of the government that the only reason for coming to court was to determine "the proper legal construction" of the Krug-Lewis Agreement"for that purpose we came into court"Pg-behind this not too imposing
facade of formality and forensics were the stark realities of a head-on clash
between powerful forces. The government was bound and determined to
end the strike. Lewis and the Mine Workers, obviously stunned by the
government's suit for injunctive relief, were equally determined to resist
the return, under a slightly different name to be sure, of the old iniquitous
labor injunction.
The disputed contract point gave the government a convenient entr6e,
a plausible basis for urging the court to protect its jurisdiction, to preserve the subject matter of the litigation-the contract. Actually, the
government was little interested in the contract. What if the disputed
point were resolved in Lewis' favor, and as a matter of contract law Lewis
may have had the better of the argument? Presumably then the government would have relied exclusively on In re Debs. If, on the other hand,
the court had ruled that Lewis had no right unilaterally to terminate the
Krug-Lewis Agreement, it seems unlikely that the matter would have
been settled. If the United Mine Workers persisted in their walkout, the
government would still be in need of injunctive relief, relying again on the
Debs case and the plea that equity restrain an illegal act.
Likewise there is something not quite real in the court's stating again
and again that the effect of the injunction was simply to preserve the
status quo, that questions of constitutional rights were not involved, and
that apart from the requirement that Lewis withdraw his termination
6sRule 42(b), Fed. Rules of Crim. Procedure, r8 U.S.C.A. § 687 foil. (Supp., 1946).
66

Record, at 204.

6

7Ibid., at i8o.
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notice, the provisions of the restraining order were simply "ancillary." 6
Actually the terms of that order seem sufficiently broad to constitute a
most effective muzzle. The defendants and all others associated with them
could not, without committing contempt, so much as discuss the dispute
or the legal matters arising from it. The miners, in turn, would appear to
have been prevented from meeting to decide whether or not to continue
with the walkout and from taking such action, normal to labor disputes, as
picketing. "Any action which would interfere with this Court's jurisdiction," it is clear, covers a multitude of sins.
II
Great cases like hard cases make bad law. For great cases are called great,
not by reason of their real importance in shaping the law of the future, but
because of some accident of immediate overwhelminginterest which appeals to
the feelings and distorts the judgment. These immediate interests exercise
a kind of hydraulic pressure which makes what previously was dear seem
doubtful, and before which even well-settled principles of law will bend.
-HoMEs, J.69
In reviewing the judgment of the lower court on petitions for certiorari
presented by the government and the defendants, the United States
Supreme Court was faced with a complex series of issues. They may, however, be summarized under four principal headings.
First, did the Norris-LaGuardia Act apply? The majority, consisting
of Mr. Chief Justice Vinson and Justices Reed, Burton, Black, and Douglas, held that it did not. The District Court was therefore within its jurisdiction in issuing the temporary restraining order. Justices Frankfurter
and Jackson disagreed. Justices Murphy and Rutledge dissented.
Second, assuming that the Norris-LaGuardia Act did apply and that
the District Court's order was beyond its jurisdiction and would have been
reversed upon appeal as void, could the defendants be punished for criminal contempt in refusing to obey the order? The majority, consisting of
Mr. Chief Justice Vinson, and Justices Reed and Burton, joined on this
point by justices Frankfurter and Jackson, held that the defendants were
properly punishable. In reaching this conclusion the majority enunciated
what I shall call the "doctrine of the void but non-frivolous order."
Justices Black and Douglas found it unnecessary to decide this point.
Justices Murphy and Rutledge dissented.
Third, were fines of $io,ooo on John L. Lewis and of $700,000 on the*
6 Ibid., at 204.
69Dissenting in Northern Securities Co. v. United States, x93 U.S. 197, 400-I (1904),
quoted by Rutledge, J., at 72o n. i.

THE DIVINE RIGHT OF GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY

421

United Mine Workers of America appropriate and not excessive as punishment for criminal contempt? The majority, consisting of Mr. Chief
justice Vinson, and Justices Reed, Burton, Frankfurter, and Jackson, upheld the imposition of these fines. Justices Black and Douglas dissented

on the ground that such criminal punishment was "inappropriate and improper," being the exercise of far more than "the least possible power adequate to the end proposed. ' ' 7° In their view only coercive sanctions were
justified, sanctions, that is, designed to coerce the defendants into obedience. Justices Murphy and Rutledge dissented on the ground that the
fines were excessive by constitutional and statutory standards. In upholding the imposition of an additional coercive fine of $2,800,000 on the
United Mine Workers "conditional on the defendant's failure to purge itself within a reasonable time,"' the majority, consisting of Mr. Chief
Justice Vinson, and Justices Reed, Burton, Black, and Douglas, accomplished the division of the lump-sum fine levied by the District Court into
its constituent parts: a punitive fine for criminal contempt and a conditional fine as a civil remedy to coerce the defendant United Mine Workers
into obeying the court's order. Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion would
seem to oblige him to dissociate himself from this part of the Court's judgment, since on his view of the applicability of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
the government as petitioner in a civil action was not entitled to relief in
the form of a sanction to coerce the defendant. Although Mr. Justice
Jackson did not state his views in full, the logic of his position would require that he join with Mr. Justice Frankfurter. Justices Murphy and
Rutledge dissented from the majority's decision on this point as on all the
others.
Fourth, was the procedure used to initiate the criminal contempt proceedings prejudicial, and was it proper to prosecute the civil and criminal
contempt charges in one proceeding? The majority, consisting of Mr.
Chief Justice Vinson and Justices Reed, Burton, Frankfurter, and Jackson, held that the procedure followed had not resulted in "substantial
prejudice" to the defendants. The position of Justices Black and Douglas
is not entirely clear on this point, but presumably they concurred with
the majority. Justices Murphy and Rutledge dissented.
Several points should be immediately apparent. The majority upholding the conviction for criminal contempt and the imposition of punitive
fines is different from the majority sustaining the imposition of coercive
penalties for civil contempt. The Vinson-Reed-Burton-Frankfurter7o Black and Douglas, JJ., at 75.
7' Vinson, C. J., at 702. The miners, of course, had returned to work on December 7, 1946.
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Jackson majority, in punishing for criminal contempt, necessarily rests
on the "doctrine of the void but non-frivolous order," violation of which
may be punished. The Chief Justice and Justices Reed and Burton also
rest their judgment at this point on the non-applicability of the NorrisLaGuardia Act. The Vinson-Reed-Burton-Black-Douglas majority, imposing coercive civil sanctions, is doing so on the theory that the NorrisLaGuardia Act does not apply. The government as petitioner for civil
relief is therefore entitled to the relief requested, and the defendants may
be coerced into obeying the order of the court granting this relief.
The majority upholding the punishment for criminal contempt could
not rest its judgment on the non-applicability of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act alone since Justices Black and Douglas considered that only coercive
and not criminal penalties were justified. Of course it may be argued that
the majority upholding the conviction for criminal contempt on this
point and the majority imposing the penalty need not be the same. Clearly they are not the same. The thing to notice, however, is this. Without
the concurrence of Justices Frankfurter and Jackson, who believe that
the Norris-LaGuardia Act dearly applies, the Court could not have imposed any punishment for the criminal contempt already committed,
since Justices Black and Douglas believed in coercive measures only.
Since Justices Frankfurter and Jackson had to adopt a position which
justified upholding the punishment for criminal contempt, it was necessary for the Chief Justice in his opinion to announce that "there are alternative grounds which support the power of the District Court to punish
violations of its orders as criminal contempt. '72 These grounds were that,
even though the Norris-LaGuardia Act rendered the injunctive relief beyond the jurisdiction of the District Court, that court "had the power to
preserve existing conditions while it was determining its own authority
to grant injunctive relief. The defendants, in making their private determination of the law, acted at their peril. Their disobedience is punishable
as criminal contempt.' ' 73 This is the "doctrine of the. void but nonfrivolous order."
74
It does not seem to me correct, therefore, as has been suggested, to
consider this portion of the majority's opinion as dictum. It is true that
adoption of this position exclusively would have required the vacating of
all relief for civil contempt, coercive or compensatory, since the position
72Vinson, C. J., at 694.

73 Vinson,

C. J., at 695.

74 Comment, 45 tMich. L. Rev. 469, 5ox n. 43 (x947). This comment contains a useful
collection and discussion of authorities bearing on the case. I am indebted to the Editors of
the Mfichigan Law Review for access to this comment prior to publication.
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begins with the assumption that the Norris-LaGuardia Act is applicable.
If the act applies, the government is clearly not entitled to the civil relief
it requests. But had not the majority of Chief Justice Vinson, Reed, and
Burton, joined by Justices Frankfurter and Jackson, spelled out these
"alternative grounds" there would have been no way of imposing criminal
penalties. Since punitive fines were assessed which could not have been
assessed without the support of Justices Frankfurter and Jackson, it would
appear clear that the "alternative grounds" stated to bring them over to
the majority side in support of criminal penalties are not dictum.
I have attempted to analyze the various positions taken by the Court
at some length, because such an inspection is necessary to an understanding of what happened and of what the decision means. Two positions
adopted by members of the Court were decisive: Justices Black and
Douglas would not support criminal penalties; Justices Frankfurter and
Jackson would not rule the Norris-LaGuardia Act inapplicable. Yet at
least two of these four were essential to the majority on all points.
It appears likely, then, that Mr. Justice Frankfurter was the key to the
entire decision. His long and well-known association with the fight to
secure an anti-injunction statute, his reputed draftsmanship of the NorrisLaGuardia Act, his intimate knowledge of its purpose and legislative
history, and his repeated authoritative pronouncements on the subject
made it unthinkable that he should hold that the act did not apply to this
case. But Mr. Justice Frankfurter doubtless felt that the defendants
should be punished. The means lay at hand-the doctrine of the void but
non-frivolous order.
The irony of the situation is obvious. The man who labored so magnificently to abolish the labor injunction finds himself forced to help reintroduce it. And reintroducing it means tieing it up with a really incredible concoction-the doctrine of the void but non-frivolous orderthe theory that "the Court can do no wrong."
APPLICABILITY OF THE NORPIS-LAGUARDIA ACT

The key to the majority's holding that the Norris-LaGuardia Act does
not apply is the determination that the government as employer is not
covered. The Chief Justice concedes at the beginning of his opinion that
the characteristics of the present case would bring it within the provisions
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act "if the basic dispute had remained one
between defendants and a private employer, and the latter had been the
plaintiff below."'7s And, the Court admits, in view of the act the United
7sVinson, C. J., at 685.
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States could not "continue to intervene by injunction in purely private
labor disputes."76 This cuts the ground out from under the position argued
by the government and adopted by the District Court, although nothing
in the Chief Justice's language says so. The Assistant Attorney Genera]
had admitted to the Supreme Court that the government's contention
amounted to saying that the Norris-LaGuardia Act impliedly kept the
Debs case alive." With a sentence or two the Chief Justice completely
disposes of the argument. This is reassuring. Whatever else the NorrisLaGuardia Act failed to accomplish-at least it killed In re Debs. The
Chief Justice goes on, however, to distinguish the circumstances of the
1894 and 1922 railway strike injunctions secured by the government as
vastly different from those involved here, "in which the Government is
seeking to carry out its responsibilities by taking action against its own
' ' 75
employees.
To establish the basic proposition that the government as employer is
not covered by the act, the Chief Justice first makes use of the rule of
construction already applied in the lower court. Since the act took away
pre-existing rights and privileges it did not apply to the sovereign in the
absence of express words t6 that effect. Thisxule, the Chief Justice stated,
had been invoked in cases "closely similar to the present one" 79 and must
have been known to the Congress in drafting the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
The policy of the act as set forth in Section 2,80 the Chief Justice found,
lent support to this view. There it appeared that the act was concerned
with the position of the "individual unorganized worker" confronted by
the organized strength of "owners of property." Its purpose therefore was
to contribute to the worker's freedom to organize and to bargain collectively without interference. These considerations, the Court considered,
"obviously do not apply to the Government as an employer or to relations
between the Government and its employees."'"
Moreover, the provisions of Sections 4 and 1382 of the act indicated
76Vinson, C. J., at 688.
77 Oral Argument, at 44. He also spoke a good deal of the war power, although declining
to rely on it exclusively as a justification for the resort to the injunctive remedy. Ibid., at

41-43.

78Vinson, C. J., at 688.
80 47 Stat. 70'(1932), 29 U.S.C.A. §
81Vinson,

79Vinson,

C. J., at 686.

102 (1942).

C.J., at 687.

' 47 Stat. 70, 73 (1932), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 104, 113 (1942). Sec. x3. When used in this Act,
and for the purposes of this Act (a) A case shall be held to involve or to grow out of a labor
dispute when the case involves persons who are engaged in the same industry, trade, craft,
or occupation; or have direct or indirect interests therein; or who are employees of the same
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that the power of the courts to issue injunctions was withdrawn only in
cases "involving or growing out of any labor dispute." A labor dispute,
according to the Chief Justice, involved "persons" in certain types of economic situations and in varying relationships to each other, and necessarily "persons" must be engaged on both sides of the dispute. Since the act
failed to define "persons," and since in ordinary usage the term "person"
does not include the sovereign, it would appear that the labor disputes
covered by the act were not those in which the sovereign might become
involved. The roles and activities performed by "persons" and "employers" or "associations of employers" were not, according to the Chief
Justice, "at all suggestive of any part played by the United States in its
relations with its own employees. ' 5' 3 Congress' failure to include any role
applicable to the government was therefore a "strong indication that it
did not intend that the Act should apply to situations in which [the]
United States appears as employer."4 What is more, the findings required by Section 7 of the act as prerequisites for the issuance of injunctions were not the sort that could or would be made if the United States
as employer were the petitioner. Clearly a finding that" the public officers
charged with the duty to protect complainant's property are unable or
unwilling to furnish adequate protection '5 s is out of place where the complainant is the government.
The Chief Justice professed to be comforted by the legislative history
of the act. While showing that the Congress did not intend to permit the
government to secure injunctions like those of 1894 and 1922, the history
employer; or who are members of the same or an affiliated organization of employers or employees; whether such dispute is (i) between one or more employers or associations of employers and one or more employees or associations of employees; (2) between one or more employers or associations of employers and one or more employers or associations of employers;
or (3) between one or more employees or associations of employees and one or more employees
or associations of employees; or when the case involves any conflicting or competing interests in a "labor dispute" (as defined in this section) of "persons participating or interested"
therein (as defined in this section). (b) A person or association shall be held to be a person
participating or interested in a labor dispute if relief is sought against him or it, and if he or
it is engaged in the same industry, trade, craft, or occupation in which such dispute occurs, or
has a direct or indirect interest therein, or is a member, officer or agent of any association composed in whole or in part of employers or employees engaged in such industry, trade, craft or
occupation. (c) The term "labor dispute" includes any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating,
fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and
employee. (d) The term "Court of the United States" means any court of the United States
whose jurisdiction has been or may be conferred or defined or limited by act of Congress,
including the courts of the District of Columbia.
83Vinson, C. J., at 687.
84Ibid.

"S47 Stat. 71

(1932), 29

U.S.C.A. § 107 (e) (1942).
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did indicate that "Congress in passing' the Act, did not intend to withdraw the Government's existing rights to injunctive relief against its own
employees."8 6 Especially significant in the view of the Court was the statement of Representative Michener, a member of the House Judiciary
Committee: "Be it remembered that this bill does not attempt to legislate concerning Government employees ..... This deals with labor disputes between individuals, not where the Government is involved. It is
my notion that under this bill the Government can function with an injunction, if that is necessary in order to carry out the purpose of the
Government." 8 Several cryptic remarks of Representative LaGuardia
were thought by the Court to reflect the same view.
The history of the War Labor Disputes Act of 194 3 , 88 and particularly
of the decisive defeat in the Senate of an amendment proposed by Senator Connally which would have made available to the government the
additional remedy of injunctive relief was not-for the Court-even mildly disturbing. Far from indicating the determination of Congress to deny
the injunctive remedy, these events seemed to the Chief Justice to disclose
no "authoritative expression of Congress directing the courts to withhold
from the United States injunctive relief in connection with an Act designed to strengthen the hand of the Government in serious labor disputes."" There was nothing to indicate "any intent to restrict the
existing authority of the courts .... 90 nothing which suggests that the
Congress intended to bar injunctions sought by the Government to aid in
the operation of seized plants."' 9 Statements by various Senators expressing their belief that, without an amendment to the legislation then
pending, injunctions could not be issued at the suit of the government
even where a plant or industry had been seized, 92 the Court could not
accept "as authoritative guides to the construction of the Norris-LaGuardia Act ..... 93We fail to see how the remarks of these Senators in
86 Vinson, C. J., at 689.
87 75 Cong. Rec. 5464, 5509 (1932).

88 57 Stat. 163 (1944), 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 1501 et seq. (1944).
8

9 Vinson, C. J., at 69i.

goIbid.
9' Ibid. In a footnote, n. 43 at 6go-gi, the Chief Justice argues that the Senate's rejection of

Senator Connally's amendment "does not necessarily imply any desire to diminish the contractual rights and remedies of the United States." This comes very close to an acceptance of
the government's original contention that since the issue was one of contract interpretation
the controversy was not a labor dispute.
92 89

Cong. Rec. 3906, 3907, 3988-89, 5754 (I943).

93 Vinson, C. J., at 69o.

THE DIVINE RIGHT OF GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY

427

1943 can serve to change the legislative intent of Congress expressed in
1932 ..... ,,94 In effect the Court is saying, therefore, that the injunctive
remedy was available all the while in the case of government employees,
regardless of what various Senators may or may not have said.
Turning to the crucial point as to whether or not miners in seized mines
could be considered government employees, the Court said that the workers clearly stood in "an entirely different relationship to the federal Government with respect to their employment from that which existed before
the seizure was effected." '95 It did not matter that they were not Government employees for all purposes. The question was whether "for the purposes of this case, the incidents of the relationship existing between the
Government and the workers are those of governmental employer and
employee." 96 The Court was impressed by the extensive changes in the
terms and conditions of employment after government seizure as embodied
in the Krug-Lewis Agreement, an agreement" solely between the Government and the union. ' 97 The government had, it appeared, "substituted
itself for the private employer in dealing with those matters which formerly were the subject of collective bargaining between the union and the
operators." 8 Lewis' refusal to deal with the coal operators as "strangers
to the Krug-Lewis agreement"99 was clear recognition of the true situation.
Of perhaps greater significance was the fact that the government, although utilizing the plant managers to operate the mines, retained "ultimate control."'"' It could give the managers any orders and instructions
it pleased and could remove them for failure to comply. The regulations
providing that none of the earnings or liabilities of the mines were to be on
the account of the government, that the companies were to be liable for all
taxes and were to remain liable for suit, the Court considered of "little
persuasive weight in determining the nature of the relation existing between the Government and the mine workers."''
Thus, as the Court viewed the provisions and history of the War
Labor Disputes Act, its net effect was to make every worker in a plant or
mine subject to seizure a potential government employee.
The Chief Justice likewise disposed of the contention that the government was not performing a sovereign function, feeling that "it would be
difficult to conceive of a more vital and urgent function of the Government
94Ibid.
9s Vinson, C. J., at 691.
96 Vinson, C. J., at 692.

98Vinson, C. J., at 693.
99Record, at 3o4.
l°° Vinson, C. J., at 693.

97Ibid.

lox
Ibid.
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than the seizure and operation of the bituminous coal mines. 1x12 The Court
concluded "that in a case such as this, where the Government has seized
actual possession of the mines, or other facilities, and is operating them,
and the relationship between the Government and the workers is that of
employer and employee, the Norris-LaGuardia Act does not apply."'3
Killing In re Debs was not quite enough.
Although Justices Black and Douglas concurred in this portion of the
Chief Justice's opinion, the language they use warrants some attention.
In their view Congress was concerned only with labor disputes between
private employers and employees. " ....
The attention of Congress was
neither focused upon, nor did it purport to affect, 'labor disputes,' if such
' 4
they can be called, between the Government and its own employees."'
Therefore specific language would be needed to indicate any Congressional intent to consider "the Government employer-employee relationship as giving rise to a 'labor dispute' in the industrial sense."' Z0 Moreover, it was perfectly clear that seizure by the government made the
miners government employees. Despite the contrary implication of the
government mine regulations, Justices Black and Douglas concluded from
the War Labor Disputes Act and the President's Executive Order that
the government operated the mines "for its own account as a matter of
law."' °6 The Chief Justice was not quite so clear on this, concluding, in
any case, that the point was not decisive.
Justices Blak and Douglas also make this significant observation: "If
we thought, as is here contended, that the Government's possession and
operation of the mines were not genuine, but merely pretended, we should
then say that the Norris-LaGuardia Act barred these proceedings. For
anything less than full and complete Government operation for its own
account would make this proceeding the equivalent of the Government's
seeking an injunction for the benefit of the private employers. We think
the Norris-LaGuardia Act prohibits that.""' 7 Justices Black and Douglas
seem anxious to reassure themselves that In re Debs is really dead.
Mr. Justice Murphy observes at the outset of his dissenting opinion:
"An objective reading of the Norris-LaGuardia Act removes any doubts
as to its meaning and as to its applicability to the facts of this case."' °8
But the Chief Justice and Justices Reed, Burton, Black, and Douglas
declined to give it such a reading. Despite its background and clearly-Vinson,
Xo Ibid.
104

C. J., at 694.

Black and Douglas, JJ., at 713.

Zos
Ibid.

To6
Ibid.
"07

Ibid.

log
Murphy, J., at 716..
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stated purpose, they chose to read the statute as though it were concerned
with depriving certain types of parties of the injunctive remedy. As the
Chief justice phrased it, there were "no evident affirmative grounds for
believing that Congress intended to withhold an otherwise available
remedy from the Government as well as from a specified class of private
persons"1 ° 9
The act was not drafted, however, to withhold remedies from classes of
persons. It was intended to define and limit "the jurisdiction and author".o By its very title it is an act
ity of the courts of the United States . ...
"to define and limit the jurisdiction of courts sitting in equity.'"' The act
"does not deal with the rights of parties but with the power of the courts.
.... Congress was concerned with the withdrawal of power from the
federal courts to issue injunctions in a defined class of cases. Nothing in
the Act remotely hints that the withdrawal of this power turns on the
character of the parties. ' ' These cases are defined as those "involving or
growing out of any labor dispute ..... " In such a case, as Section 4 clearly provides, "No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue
any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction ..... ,,113
This is made abundantly clear by the definition of labor dispute contained in Section 13(c), which reads:
The term "labor dispute" includes any controversy concerning terms or conditions
of employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions
of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate
4
relation of employer and employee."1
11

Obviously, under this provision a labor dispute is a controversy about
terms or conditions of employment, and the dispute between the government and the United Mine Workers or the operators and the United Mine
Workers meets that requirement beyond any doubt. It is perhaps significant, therefore, that the Chief Justice's opinion does not once refer to
Section 13(c), consigning it without comment to the relative obscurity of
a footnote.
Reading the act objectively makes it apparent that whether or not the
government is a "person," as that term is used in Sections i 3 (a) and (b),
is irrelevant. The term "labor dispute" is defined without reference to the
l0 Vinson, C. J., at 684.

"047 Stat. 70 (932),
01147 Stat. 70 (1932).
113 47

Stat. 70 (1932),

29

U.S.C.A. § 102 (1942).
,,Frankfurter, J., at 706.

29

U.S.C.A. § 104 (1942).

47 Stat. 73 (r932), 29 U.S.C.A. § 113 (c) (1942).
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persons involved in that dispute. The only purpose of defining the term
"person" is to be sure to include virtually anyone having any connection
with a labor dispute, and this is necessary in order to cover all possible
cases. "Cases," not "labor disputes," are defined in terms of "persons."
According to Section i 3 (b), if relief is sought against a person or association, and if he is" engaged in the same industry, trade, craft, or occupation
in which [the] dispute occurs, or has a direct or indirect interest therein,"
or is a member or officer of any associationof employers or employees engaged in that industry, trade, "craft, or occupation, then he is a person
"participating or interested in a labor dispute."'". Both Section 13(a),
which the Chief Justice relies on, and Section 13(c), which he ignores,
clearly show that the employer-employee relationship is not a requisite
of a labor dispute. And while one may perhaps accept the Chief Justice's
assumption that Section 13 requires that "persons" as there defined be
engaged on both sides of the dispute, it is clear beyond question that a
"case" poses no such condition. There is no requirement that relief be
sought by a "person" participating in a dispute. It is enough if relief is
sought againstsuch a "person."
The fatal weakness of the Chief Justice's argument is that he tries to
interpret the Norris-LaGuardia Act as though it were intended to deprive
certain "persons" of their equitable remedies. Since "persons" to him look
like private employers or employees or associations of private employers
or employees, he cannot see the sovereign masquerading as a "person."
And since only those "persons" included in Section 13 can be considered
in determining the meaning of a "labor dispute," which the, Chief Justice
treats as if it were defined in terms of "persons," the sovereign is not involved in the sort of "labor dispute" covered by Section 13. All this effort
is without benefit of Section 13(c).
Now the most remarkable thing of all is that implicitly the Chief Justice
recognizes that his concern with the meaning of "person" is beside the
point. He admits that the government, as an outsider having no part in
the dispute, cannot intervene to secure an injunction against any party
engaged in a private labor dispute. And the only reason why this must
be so-and this step the Chief Justice does not take-is that the party
seeking the relief is irrelevant so long as there is a labor dispute and relief
is sought against a "person" engaged or interested in that dispute. In no
other way could the act have killed In re Debs.
But remember, now, the Chief Justice relies on the rule of construction
which preserves the sovereign's rights and privileges unless there is a
11s See note 82 supra for the text of Section 13.
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clearly expressed intent to divest them. This argument, as Mr. Justice
Frankfurter points out, proves too much. If the rule applies at all, it must
preserve the sovereign's rights in all situations. "Accordingly, the courts
would not be limited in their jurisdiction when the United States is a
party and the Act would not apply in any proceeding in which the United
States is complainant."", 6 The Chief Justice wants to use the rule to protect the rights of the United States as employer. But if the rule has any
efficacy, it must also preserve the rights of the United States to injunctive
relief whenever the public interest requires, regardless of whether the
United States is an employer, a temporary custodian, or a rank outsider
in a labor dispute. If the canon applies, then In re Debs is not dead after
all.
Reading these two portions of the Chief Justice's opinion together
makes his dilemma obvious. He could hardly say that In re Debs was still
alive and kicking. The purpose and history of the act were too clear on this
point to be ignored. But to kill In re Debs it was necessary to interpret the
act sufficiently objectively to accept its intention of preventing the
government, as an outsider in a labor dispute, from intervening to secure
an injunction. Section 13 (c) is essential to spelling out this intent, but the
Chief Justice preferred not to cite it. For to demonstrate that the government as outsider to a labor dispute was deprived of a remedy which the
government as insider retained, required showing-a most difficult taskthat the act defined "labor dispute" in terms of the "persons" involved in
that dispute. It was therefore wise to leave Section 13(c) strictly alone.
The canon of construction was then called into play to make sure that the
government as employer was really excluded, overlooking entirely the
point that if the rule was valid, it excluded the government in all its
capacities from the limitations imposed by the act. Thus the Chief
Justice's opinion on the Norris-LaGuardia Act is nothing but an elaborate
tussle with In re Debs, in which that amiable ghost proves mighty hard to
lay.
The Chief Justice would have been better advised to confine his remarks on the Norris-LaGuardia Act to the views expressed so briefly by
Justices Black and Douglas. Or all three might have written only this:
"These miners are genuine, honest, God-fearing government employees, no
matter what the government mine regulations say. So the situation is entirely different from In re Debs. Anyway Debs is dead. How do we know?
Because we said so!"
Moreover, the canon of construction which helps the Chief Justice out
Frankfurter, J., at 706.
G6
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of one difficulty only to land him in another is totally out of place here. As
Mr. justice Frankfurter effectively argues, it is not a rule of law but an
aid to the construction of statutes. It necessarily depends for its effectiveness on the subject matter and setting of the statute and clearly cannot be
used in defiance of these other aspects of the total statutory environment.
Thus the meaning of the statute as derived from its history and purpose
"ought not to be subordinated to an abstract canon of construction that
carries the residual flavor of the days when a personal sovereign was the
law-maker."117
Application of the canon to this case involves a particularly flagrant
instance of judge-made political theory. It is bad enough to have the term
"sovereign" tossed around with reckless abandon. It is worse, however,
to be informed that a statute which has as its express purpose the placing
of limitations upon "the jurisdiction and authority of the courts of the
United States" does not apply to the sovereign because there are no
express words to that effect. How more explicitly could the "courts of the
United States" be expressed in statutory language, and as "courts of the
United States" are they not an integral part of the government, of the
sovereign, if you will? A statute limiting the power of courts does just
that, and the limitations can be removed only by the body that imposed
them, the Congress. To argue otherwise is to advance the absurd proposition that Congress commanded that courts of the United States should
not abuse their equity powers unless requested to do so by the sovereign.
And who is the sovereign in this situation? Presumably, on the Court's
theory, the Executive is the sovereign, even though orthodox American
political theory of a government of limited powers would shudder at the
suggestion. The Chief Justice departed from solid ground as soon as he
chose to disregard the obvious fact that the Norris-LaGuardia Act limited
the power of courts, and that courts are part of the government or
sovereign.
The cases relied on by the Court to show the wide acceptance of this
rule are anything but "closely similar." In not one instance was a statute
involved which expressly prohibited courts from acting in a certain class
of cases."1 Obviously, legislation which deprives private parties of certain
legal rights or remedies may or may not apply to the government, and a
X17Ibid.
X11
United States v. Stevenson, 215 U.S. i9o (igog),(sustaining the right of the government

to enforce a statute, making it a misdemeanor to assist in the illegal immigration of alien
laborers, by criminal indictment where only a civil remedy was specifically authorized);
United States v. American Bell Tel. Co., 159 U.S. 548 (I89S) (permitting the government to
appeal to the Supreme Court in a suit to cancel a patent even though judgments or decrees of
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rule of construction, in the absence of explicit provisions, may prove a
necessity. But even the resulting presumption that the government is not
covered, and therefore that its rights and remedies are not restricted, has
been expressly held inapplicable "to acts of legislation which lay down
general rules of procedure in civil actions."" 9 It would seem rudimentary
that rules of civil procedure should apply to the government as party as
well as to private litigants. In a very real sense the Norris-LaGuardia Act
is a procedural statute.
In the expert hands of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, the legislative history
of the act constitutes a most effective weapon in refutation of the majority's argument. Admittedly, Congress did not have dearly in mind the
situation involved in this case where the government has assumed certain
responsibilities in an essentially private industry and has therefore become interested in a labor dispute. The remarks of Representative LaGuardia at most imply that the government would still be free to obtain
an injunction against the employees of the Treasury or Post Office Department. By saying that he did "not see how in any possible way the
United States can be brought in under the provisions of this bill,"'' he
apparently meant that the United States was not engaged in an "industry,
trade, craft, or occupation." If the remarks of Representative Michener,
so helpful to the Chief Justice, meant anything more, they necessarily
implied that the government might secure an In re Debs injunction at any
time the public interest required, regardless of whether it was the employer or not. But the language of the Court's opinion, if not its logic, rejects this contention. In any case, the records of the Senate and of its
Judiciary Committee, the driving force behind the bill, yield no similar
ambiguities."'
Even if it be assumed, therefore, that the act was not intended to apply
to labor disputes involving employees of the United States, are the miners
employees of the United States? As Mr. Justice Frankfurter puts it, their
status is a hybrid one, 2 a description to which the Assistant Attorney
General assented in oral argumentY.3 Their relation to the government is
circuit courts of appeal were to be final in cases arising under the patent laws); Dollar Savings
Bank v. United States, i9 Wall. (U.S.) 227 (x873) (involving the collection of taxes by an
action for debt, where the court appears unnecessarily to have applied the canon of construction inasmuch as the statute authorized the action).
"19Green v. United States, 9 Wall. (U.S.) 655, 658 (r869). Cf. United States v. Rice, 327
U.S. 742 (1946).
1

75 Cong. Rec. 5503

(1932).

Frankfurter, J., at 708.
12,
2= Frankfurter, J., at 709.

23

Oral Argument, at 41.
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not the same as that of a clerk in a drug-store, nor is it on all fours with
the relation between the government and the employees of the Treasury
Department. The role of the government has aptly been described as that
of "a receiver that would be charged with the continuity of operation of
the plant.' ' r4 The fact that a business is in the hands of a federal receiver,
however, does not make the Norris-LaGuardia Act inapplicable.125
Nothing in the War Labor Disputes Act indicates that employees in seized
plants were to be considered government employees in the usual sense of
the term. In any event they are not quite the simon-pure government
employees that justices Black and Douglas make them out to be.
Thus it is important to look at the legislative history of the War Labor
Disputes Act of 1943. The case arose, it must be remembered, since the
Court occasionally ignores the fact, as a sequel to government seizure
under this statute. The unmistakable conclusion is that Congress considered at length the advisability of granting the injunctive remedy to
prevent interference with the operation of seized plants. It unequivocally
decided not to grant it. "Remedy by injunction was not given. It was not
merely omitted. A fair reading of the legislative history shows that it was
expressly and definitively denied."'' €6 The statements of various Senators
during the debates underscore this intention, and their remarks make
sense only by assuming that they really believed that, in the form the
War Labor Disputes Act was enacted, the injunction was not an available
remedy. They had the coal situation clearly in mind, and they decided
against adding the injunction to the other means of enforcement specified
in the act. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter says, "to find that the Government
has the right which Senator Connally's amendment sought to confer but
which the Congress withheld is to say that voting down the amendment
had the same effect as voting it up.11127
If, as the majority assumes, the injunction power was there all the
time, safely tucked away in an implied interpolation exempting the government as employer from the Norris-LaGuardia Act, then the great
concern and lengthy deliberations on the part of Congress were all invain.
X24Under Secretary of War Patterson at Hearings on S. 2054, Sub-Committee of Senate
Judiciary Committee, 77th Cong. ist Sess., at i4 (1941), quoted by Frankfurter, J. at 709.
12SAnderson v. Bigelow, i3o F. 2d 46o (C.C.A. 9th, 1942), cert. den., 317 U.S. 69o (1942).
But compare the apparently contrary results reached in cases involving § 77B of the Bankruptcy Act. In re Cleveland and Sandusky Brewing Co., ii F. Supp. i98 (Ohio, 1935), noted
critically in 45 Yale LJ.372 (1935), 35 Col. L. Rev. 1140 (1935), and 49 Harv. L. Rev. 341
(1935); Converse v. Highway Const. Co., io7 F. 2d 127 (C.C.A. 6th, 1939). The labor injunction appears to have had its origin in the case of a railroad in receivership. Gregory,
Labor and the Law 95-97 (1946).
6
m Frankfurter, J., at 710.
X"7Frankfurter, 3., at 712.
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If Congress passed Senator Connally's amendment, then the injunctive
remedy was available in the act. If Congress defeated it, then the injunctive remedy was available outside the act and in the implied exception
to the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Whatever it did in 1943, Congress was
obviously just wasting its time. The statements and speeches of Congressmen and Senators amounted to nothing more than a lengthy contribution
to the New Yorker's Wind on Capitol Hill Department.
On the majority's assumptions there is but one escape from this conclusion. Perhaps Congress knew what it was doing. It voted down Senator
Connally's proposal for an injunctive remedy, knowing all the while that
win or lose the remedy was there if needed. But Justice Rutledge pointedly
remarks: "We cannot attribute to Congress an intent so duplicitous.
....It would be to find Congress guilty of using a devious method for

28
achieving indirectly exactly the thing it expressly declined to do.111
But even if the argument of the majority be accepted with respect to
the nature of the relationship created by seizure under the War Labor
Disputes Act, it still does not follow that a labor dispute ceases through
seizure to be a labor dispute under the terms of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
The question is whether the government's taking possession "changed the
private character of the underlying labor dispute between the operators
'
and the miners so as to make inapplicable the Norris-LaGuardia Act. I29
The Chief Justice, although relegating to a footnote the facts of the
underlying labor dispute here involved,' 3 ° uses language which shows that
he recognizes clearly that the War Labor Disputes Act had to do with
labor disputes. Thus at one point he speaks of "labor disputes in plants
seized by the United States.' I 3' In this connection the language of Mr.
Justice Murphy is worth quoting at length:

In my opinion, the miners remained private employees despite the temporary gloss of
Government possession and operation of the mines; they bear no resemblance whatever to employees of the executive departments, the independent agencies and the other
branches of the Government. But when all is said and done, the obvious fact remains
that this case involves and grows out of a labor dispute between the operators and the
miners. Government seizure of the mines cannot hide or change that fact. Indeed, the
seizure took place only because of the existence of the dispute and because it was
thought some solution might thereafter result. The dispute, however, survived the
seizure and is still very much alive. And it still retains its private character, the operators on the one side and the coal miners on the other .....
32
The Government's seizure of the coal mines thus becomes irrelevant to the issue.
Rutledge, J., at 721.
129Murphy, J., at 717.
330 Vinson, C. J., at 681 n. 1.
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Vinson, C. J., at 69o .
132 Murphy, J., at 717-18.
13Z
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The efforts of the Court to find support in the words of John L. Lewis
only serve as an invitation to dig up some of the gems penned by Secretary
Krug. The Secretary, it will be remembered, informed Lewis,that certain
of his proposals were "of such a fundamental nature that they should be
directed to the owners and private operators .... rather than to the
' 33
Government, which is only the interim custodian of these properties.'
This mind you, is the sovereign as employer speaking! In fact, the only
comic relief in the entire sorry story is in the strenuous efforts of both
Lewis and Krug to make each other eat his own words.
It seems to me that the arguments of the dissenting Justices are unanswerable. Yet the fact is that the majority has so interpreted the NorrisLaGuardia Act as to make possible the use of seizure as a subterfuge for
breaking strikes. The requirement of Justices Black and Douglas that the
operation by the government be full and complete and for its own account
would seem to be no real bar. The government could intervene in any
private dispute at the request of the owners, seize the plant, secure an injunction on the theory that the employees were now government employees, break the strike, and then return the properties to private
hands. "That," as Mr. Justice Murphy wrote, "essentially is what has
happened in this case. That is what makes the decision today so full of
dangerous implications for the future. Moreover, if the Government is to
use its seizure power to repudiate the Norris-LaGuardia Act and to intervene by injunction in private labor disputes, that policy should be deter' 4
mined by Congress."'
And before we leave the subject, let us ask two simple questions. Is In re
Debs really dead? And if so, who, or rather what, killed it?
THE DOCTRINE OF THE VOIh BUT NON-FRIVOLOUS ORDER

However much one may deplore the seeming perversion of Congressional intent involved in ruling the Norris-LaGuardia Act inapplicable,
it must be conceded that an affirmation of the judgment of the District
Court on this ground alone would have been infinitely preferable to the
course actually adopted by the Court. The "alternative grounds which
support the power of the District Court to punish violations of its orders
as criminal contempt" 35 are so far-reaching in their implications that one
cannot help wishing Mr. Justice Frankfurter had turned his back on the
"33

Note 28. supra.

134 Murphy, J., at 718.
x3SVinson, C. J., at 694.
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plain meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. These "alternative grounds,"
not John L. Lewis' behavior, constitute the "serious threat to orderly
constitutional government.'

'

36

As I have attempted to demonstrate, I do not believe these "alternative
grounds" represent dictum. They are essential to the Court's decision.
Essential, that is, unless one is willing to conclude from the opinions that
Lewis and the United Mine Workers were found guilty of and punished for
criminal contempt by Chief Justice Vinson and Justices Reed and Burton
because they violated a valid court order to which the Norris-LaGuardia
Act did not apply, and by Justices Frankfurter and Jackson because they
violated a non-frivolous order which was void because the Norris-LaGuardia Act did apply. Three plus two equals the necessary majority.
But when it is remembered that Justices Black and Douglas supported
the Chief Justice and Justices Reed and Burton in holding the NorrisLaGuardia Act not applicable, balking only at the imposition of criminal
penalties for the contempt already committed, then it appears that considering the "alternative grounds" as dictum and so not essential to the
judgment amounts to saying that the defendants were found guilty by five
Justices (Vinson, Reed, Burton, Black, and Douglas) of one thing-violating a valid order-and punished by a different five Justices (Vinson,
Reed, Burton, Frankfurter, and Jackson) for another-violating a void
but non-frivolous order. It is just a bit hard to see how Justices Frankfurter and Jackson could punish the defendants for something for which
they were not found guilty. Even if this were possible, the judgment could
have been affirmed without any statement of "alternative gounds" by the
Chief Justice. Only Mr. Justice Frankfurter need have stated them, with
Mr. Justice Jackson concurring.
The government's complaint sought a declaratory judgment. Pending
that determination it asked for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction to preserve the subject-matter of the litigation and
to protect the court's jurisdiction. The government, it will be recalled,
tried to side-step the Norris-LaGuardia Act by asserting-among other
things-that this was not a "labor dispute," but only a controversy about
the meaning of a contract. In disposing of the act, however, the Court did
not adopt this argument, holding instead that insofar as the controversy
136 Vinson, C. J., at 702. This article is in no sense a defense of the course of action adopted
by John L. Lewis and the United Mine Workers. At best, that course seems to me to have been
extremely ill-advised. Yet the stamp of approval given by the Supreme Court to the measures
taken by the government, can have, in Mr. Justice Murphy's words, "tragic consequences
even more serious and lasting than a temporary dislocation of the nation's economy resulting
from a strike of the miners" (at 7M7). These possible consequences are what must now concern us.
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was a labor dispute it was a labor dispute between the government as employer and its employees, a type of labor dispute not covered by the act.
If, however, we assume that this is the kind of labor dispute covered by
-the act, the court had no authority to issue any restraining order or injunction. It had no authority, in short, since the case involved or grew
out of a labor dispute. But initially the court had to determine whether
or not it did have this authority. It had to determine whether or not the
Norris-LaGuardia Act applied to take that authority away. While deciding its own authority to grant injunctive relief, it was clearly empowered,
the Court holds'137 to preserve existing conditions. Mr. Justice Frankfurter dwells on the delicate functions of a court in these circumstances,
saying that "no type of controversy is more peculiarly fit for judicial determination than a controversy that calls into question the power of a
38
court to decide.'
Since the defendants chose to ignore the order of the court preserving
the status quo, they can be punished for criminal contempt. Now the
Chief Justice and Mr. justice Frankfurter take pains to point out that not
every order of a court must be obeyed pending the court's decision as to
39
its own jurisdiction. The question of jurisdiction might be frivolous.1
Only then, however, "only when a court is so obviously traveling outside
its orbit as to be merely usurping judicial forms and facilities, may an
order issued by a court be disobeyed and treated as though it were a
'' °
letter to a newspaper. r4
But in the absence of a clearly frivolous question of jurisdiction and
of plain usurpation by the court, the order must be obeyed until it is reversed on appeal. "No one .... ," Mr. justice Frankfurter informs us,
"can be judge in his own case."'4'r Except, he might have added, a judge.
Now here, the argument runs, the question of the court's jurisdiction in
view of the possible applicability of the Norris-LaGuardia Act was a substantial one. The point "had not previously received judicial consideration,Y42 and such jurisdictional questions are "apt to raise difficult technical problems.' 43 Although his superb argument demonstrating that the
Norris-LaGuardia Act did apply-that its "text, context, content and historical setting" all lead to this conclusion-might seem evidence to the
Vinson, C. J., at 695.
X38
Frankfurter, J., at 703.
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139 Vinson, C. J., at 695-96; Frankfurter, J., at 704.
14 Vinson, C. J., at 696.
140 Frankfurter, J., at 704.
141Frankfurter, J., at 703.

X43
Frankfurter, J., at 703.
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contrary, Mr. Justice Frankfurter is now constrained to say that "the
words cannot be taken quite so simply."'44 The circumstances here "certainly were not covered by the Act with inescapable clarity."'4S The question was not "so frivolous that any judge should have summarily thrown
the Government out of court."'' 46 Courts are set up to decide such questions.

". ....

The very existence of a court presupposes its power to enter-

tain a controversy, if only to decide, after deliberation, that it has no
power over the particular controversy."' 47 This proposition, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter gives assurance, cannot be used in an ordinary labor dispute
to nullify the Norris-LaGuardia Act, and any judge who used it for that
purpose would be "a pretender to, not a wielder of, judicial power."'r 8
But lengthy arguments, elaborate briefs, and much reflection and consideration were here necessary to decide the question. The court, therefore, could issue appropriate orders "so as to afford the necessary time for
fair consideration and decision while existing conditions were pre' This was a real controversy,
served.'T49
it seems, and so the court might
issue a real order. Though that order might be reversed on appeal as void,
disobedience would entail punishment for contempt.
This doctrine is built on a decision by-of all people-Mr. Justice
Holmes, United States v. Shipp,s ° decided in I9o6. That case arose out of
the conviction and sentencing to death for rape of one Johnson in a
Tennessee state court. Johnson sought a writ of habeas corpus from the
United States Circuit Court in Tennessee, alleging that his constitutional
rights had been denied him during trial. The petition was denied, and the
petitioner appealed to the United States Supreme Court. The appeal was
allowed, and the Court thereupon issued an order "that all proceedings
against the appellant be stayed ..... Shipp, the sheriff having custody
of the petitioner, was notified of this order. It appeared, however, that he
conspired with members of a mob which took Johnson out of jail and
lynched him. For this action Shipp and other members of the mob were
charged with contempt. Their defense was that the Circuit Court had no
jurisdiction since the constitutional arguments asserted by the petitioner
were frivolous, and that the Supreme Court had no appellate jurisdiction
since the case did not involve "the construction or application of the Constitution of the United States." Therefore the order issued without jurisdiction might be violated with impunity. The Supreme Court rejected
r44 Frankfurter,

J., at

704.

X4sIbid.

'48
Ibid.

'46Ibid.

'49
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toid.

Ibid.
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U.S. 563 (19o6).
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this argument as "unsound." Since Mr. Justice Holmes' language is basic
to the majority's opinion in this case, it must be quoted in full:
It has been held, it is true, that orders made by a court having no jurisdiction to make
them may be disregarded without liability to process for contempt. In re Sawyer,
124 U.S. 200; Ex parte Fisk, 113 U.S. 713; Ex parte Rowland, 1O4 U.S. 604. But even
if the Circuit, Court had no jurisdiction to entertain Johnson's petition, and if this
court had no jurisdiction of the appeal, this court, and this court alone, could decide
that such was the law. It and it alone necessarily had jurisdiction to decide whether the
case was properly before it. On that question, at least, it was its duty to permit
argument and to take the time required for such consideration as it might need .....
Until its judgment declining jurisdiction should be announced, it had authority from
the necessity of the case to make orders to preserve the existing conditions and the
subject of the petition, just as the state court was bound to refrain from further proceedings until the same time.' s '
In oral argument before the District Court, Assistant Attorney Gen-2
eral Sonnett said of the Shipp case: ". . . . it cannot be distinguished.''
This, it would appear, is a slight exaggeration. In the first place, there was
not involved in the Shipp case any Act of Congress directly forbidding the
courts to issue orders in a particular class of cases. It is true that there
was a problem of statutory construction, since the jurisdiction of the court
under statute depended on finding a constitutional question. But there
was no clear command that the court should not issue orders in that class
of cases not involving a constitutional question. Whereas here there was
an unequivocal withdrawal of authority to issue orders in that class of
cases involving or growing out of labor disputes. And it is to be noted that
the Norris-LaGuardia Act makes no exception for interlocutory orders
issued in cases where there is serious doubt as to the Court's jurisdiction.
Consequently, even though the court in the Shipp case might be without
jurisdiction because of the absence of a constitutional question, and without jurisdiction in this case because of the presence of a labor dispute, the
two cases are not comparable since in the Shipp case there was no statute
forbidding the issuance of an order pending determination of the jurisdictional problem. But here such an order runs afoul of the express prohibition of Congress, because clearly an order issued to preserve the court's
jurisdiction in a case which involves a labor dispute is no less an order in
a case 'involving or growing out of" a labor dispute merely because the
first question on the agenda is whether or not it does involve or grow out
of a labor dispute.
It may plausibly be urged, nonetheless, that the position taken by the
Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Frankfurter rests on the distinction between
Isr Ibid.,

at 573.
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an order issued in a case involving or growing out of a labor dispute and
an order issued to protect the court's jurisdiction and preserve the subject
matter, which order happens to be issued in a case ultimately found to
involve or grow out of a labor dispute. This latter type of order, presumably, would be exempt from the prohibitions of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act. But the Chief Justice, in stating that if the order were found void on
appeal the petitioner would not be entitled to civil relief, makes this distinction hard to maintain. "The right to remedial relief falls with an injunction which events prove was erroneously issued ....and a fortiori
when the injunction or restraining order was beyond the jurisdiction of
the court. Nor does the reason underlying United States v. Shipp ....
compel a different result. If the Norris-LaGuardia Act were applicable in
this case the conviction for civil contempt would be reversed in its entirety."'5 3 The civil contempt conviction would fall because the order was
void as beyond the jurisdiction of the court. And there was only one order
issued, not two. It is hard to see how this one order can be both void and
not-void, even though you distinguish between its civil-relief and its
jurisdiction-preserving aspects. If it is void at all, it must be because it is
an order issued in a case involving or growing out of a labor dispute. It
cannot at the same time be a valid, disembodied, interlocutory, jurisdiction-preserving order having no relation to the labor dispute.
54
It is also to be noted that Mr. Justice Holmes, in citing the Sawyer,'
Fisk, ss and Rowland' cases, gave no indication that he intended to overrule them. Those cases are good authority-at least they were until the
decision in the Lewis case served to confuse their status-for the proposition that where an order of a court is void, as being without jurisdiction,
"the order punishing for contempt is equally void.' 7 All that Holmes
could have intended was to distinguish these cases. This may be done very
simply since nond of them involved an order of a court having for its purpose the preservation of the status quo pending a determination of its
jurisdiction to proceed in the case. Not one was a case in which a court
had found it necessary to preserve the subject-matter of the litigation. Nor
did the contempt charged in any of them effectively destroy the subjectmatter. That is why Mr. Justice Holmes brushed them aside.
IS Vinson, C. J., at 696-97. This statement of the Chief Justice is also evidence for the view
that as used in the Norris-La Guardia Act "jurisdiction" means "power."
IN4In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 2oo (x888).
1SEx parte Fisk, i13 U.S. 713 (1885).
156
Ex parte Rowland, io4 U.S. 604 (1881).
57 Ex parte Fisk, 113 U.S. 713, 718 (1885); Beauchamp v. United States, 76 F. 2d 663
(C.C.A. 9 th, 1935).
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For in the Shipp case it was imperative that the subject-matter be preserved. The court had authority "from the necessity of the case" to issue
orders preserving the "existing conditions" and the "subject of the petition." And what did Mr. Justice Holmes mean by these phrases? Clearly he
meant that while the court was deciding whether or not it had jurisdiction
to grant habeas corpus it was essential that the petitioner be kept alive.
"From the necessity of the case" he had to be kept alive-otherwise there
could be no case. Mr. Justice Holmes removes all doubt as to his meaning
by saying--in a passage ignored by the Court here: "We cannot regard
the grounds upon which the petition for habeas corpus was presented as
frivolous or a mere pretense. The murder of the petitioner has made it impossible to decide that case ..... ,,8
But there is no comparable "necessity of the case" here. The actions of
Lewis and the United Mine Workers did not oust the jurisdiction of the
court, they did not make it impossible to decide the case presented by the
government-the question of whether or not Lewis had the authority unilaterally to terminate the Krug-Lewis Agreement. Instead of listening to
disjointed discussions on sovereignty and the subtleties of civil and criminal contempt, judge Goldsborough might have been applying his knowledge of contract law to the problem at hand. Whether John L. Lewis
ignored the preliminary order and whether the miners stayed away from
the mines or not-the contract problem remained properly before the
court, ready, willing, and able to be decided. A declaratory judgment
issued while the miners were on strike would have been just as valid and
effective a judgment as one issued at any other time. The ability of the
court to proceed in the cause was in no wise defeated by what Lewis and
the United Mine Workers did. Mr. Shipp's violation of the Court order
had a totally different effect. It should be obvious even to an Assistant
Attorney General that there can be no habeas corpus if the corpus has
become a corpse.
As Mr. Justice Murphy observes of the Court's reasoning, "these arguments have a seductive attractiveness here."'"s judges are very frequently
seduced by attractive argument in labor cases. Witness Lord Chancellor
Halsbury's would-be contribution to labor law in the famous English case
158 United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563, 573-74 (19o6). There is a further distinction which
the Court does not appear to recognize. In the Shipp case an order was issued pending determination of the Court's jurisdiction over the controversy. Here the doubt relates to the district
court's jurisdiction or authority to grant injunctive relief. By issuing a temporary order pending a determination of that jurisdictional question, the district court necessarily asserts its
authority and so resolves the doubt in its favor. See Jurisdictional Considerations in United
States v. United Mine Workers, 47 Col. L. Rev. 5o5, 506-7 (i947).
'9 Murphy, J., at 718.
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of Allen v. Flood 6o in 1898, which involved a union representative's inducing an employer to discharge two workers who belonged to another union.
The Lord Chancellor said that this was like the case in which it was long
ago held that a man behaved unlawfully when he deliberately scared
away wild fowl from his neighbor's decoys by firing a gun into the air
over his own land.
The Shipp case has an equal relevance here. It ignores the whole background of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the hard inescapable facts of
labor relations. The labor injunction was a strike-breaker pure and
simple. It did its dirtiest work in the form of the ex parte restraining
order, in the name of the status quo. But there is and can be no status
quo in a labor dispute. Relations are too fluid and fast-moving. As soon as
you require unions and workers to obey a court order, you have in all
likelihood effectively broken the strike, and without there having been an
opportunity for the merits of the controversy to be heard. To say that the
order can be tested on appeal is simply to acknowledge the fact that the
order has served its purpose by forcing the appeal. The history of the labor
injunction shows that most such cases were never carried beyond the restraining order or preliminary injunction stage. "The preliminary proceed'6
ings, in other words, make the issue of final relief a practical nullity.' '
The strike being broken, the litigation terminates.
Congress knew all this and intended the Norris-LaGuardia Act to put
a stop to it. In the words of Mr. Justice Murphy:
If we are to hold these defendants in contempt for having violated a void restraining
order, we must close our eyes to the expressed will of Congress and to the whole history of equitable restraints in the field of labor disputes. We must disregard the fact
that to compel one to obey a void restraining order in a case involving a labor dispute and to require that it be tested on appeal is to sanction the use of the restraining
order to break strikes-which was precisely what Congress wanted to avoid. Every
reason supporting the salutary principle of the Shipp case breaks down when that
principle is applied in this setting.6'e
Mr. Justice Frankfurter assured us that in ordinary private labor
disputes the Norris-LaGuardia Act could not be defeated by the technique of securing an injunction under the guise of preserving the court's
jurisdiction to decide whether or not it has jurisdiction. Yet in a case
cited approvingly by the Chief Justice, Carterv. United States, 63 the origi"°

[I898], A.C.
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Frankfurter and Greene, The Labor Injunction
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i6 Murphy, J., at 7M9.
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r35 F. 2d 858 (C.C.A. 5th, 1943).
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nal petition for an injunction in a labor dispute was brought by a private
party. Thus, although the Court rejected the government's contention
that asking for a declaratory judgment with regard to a contract was
enough to by-pass the act, a technique any private employer might use,
it appears that the Shipp doctrine again brings the private employer into
his own.
In the Cartercase a restaurant owner obtained a temporary restraining
order, without notice but after entry of findings as required by the act, to
restrain picketing, boycotting, and similar activities on the part of defendants. An injunction was later issued over the defendant's objections
that the court had no jurisdiction because of lack of diversity of citizenship and the absence of a federal question. On appeal these objections were
sustained and the injunction vacated16 4 Meanwhile, however, the defendant had violated the order, and for this he was held to be properly
punishable for criminal contempt. The Circuit Court of Appeals applied
the Shipp case, saying that the trial court could lawfully "by a temporary
injunction preserve the business which was the subject of the litigation
....pending a hearing of a doubtful question of jurisdiction."'16s The
court stated that the question of jurisdiction was not frivolous. But clearly
this is a misuse of the Shipp doctrine. Between preserving petitioner's life
in the Shipp case and petitioner's restaurant business in the Carter case
there is a world of difference.
Now in the Carter case the petitioner complied with the Norris-Laguardia Act. In fact, with a labor dispute on his hands, he attempted to
argue that the act impliedly gave federal courts power to grant injunctive
relief in all cases provided certain procedural requirements were met and
findings made. His only trouble was that he had no business in a federal
court at all. Consequently, the order of the court was not an order issued
in face of the express prohibitions of the act. So far as the act was concerned the court complied with it. What was lacking was federal jurisdiction. Thus the order preserving the status quo pending determination of
that question at least had this element of respectability-it was not in defiance of the express commands of Congress. So the Carter case is not
strictly applicable to the Lewis case. It is like the Shipp case in that no
statutory prohibition was involved, but it represents a misapplication of
the Shipp doctrine in that there was no "necessity of the case" to preserve
x64

Brown v. Coumanis, i35 F. 2d 163 (C.C.A. 5th, 1943).

x6sCarter v. United States, 135 F. 2d 858, 862 (C.C.A. 5th, 1943). The court distinguished

the Sawyer, Fisk, and Rowland cases, supra notes 154, 155, and i56, on the ground that they
involved civil
and not criminal contempts. But Ex parte Fisk is plainly a criminal contempt
case.
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the petitioner's restaurant business. It was not a case where without the
order there could have been no further proceedings.
The Carter case is clearly wrong, because it involves punishing a defendant for violating an order that turns out to be void on appeal. This, as
dissenting Judge Hutcheson objects, 66 is directly contrary to the provisions of the United States Code which authorize proceeding against a
person for criminal contempt only if he has willfully disobeyed "any lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command of any district court of
the United States ..... ,,167
Since the court had no authority to issue
the order, that order was not lawful. Therefore the defendant should not
have been punished.
The same statutory provision governs in the Lewis case, although it is not
to be found in any of the majority opinions, not even in the footnotes. Yet
the majority must implicitly interpret "lawful" to include "interlocutory
orders issued without jurisdiction as determined finally upon review."' 6
It should be noted that the Shipp case, on the other hand, is not affected
by any difficulty as to the meaning of "lawful," for there the Court never
determined that the order Shipp had violated was invalid, since it never
passed on the question of its jurisdiction to grant habeas corpus.
Mr. Justice Rutledge makes the further point that misuse of the Shipp
doctrine in this way would serve to defeat the jurisdiction of courts in
habeas corpus proceedings.'6 9 Supposing Lewis had been punished by imprisonment instead of by fine. The position taken by the majority would
require denying his writ for habeas corpus, even though the court might
find void the order under which he was imprisoned. Until fairly recently,
habeas corpus has been the only method of securing review of a criminal
contempt convictionYo° A party who chooses to ignore an order is taking
his chances that it will turn out to be void on appeal, or when he brings
habeas corpus, and traditionally a person imprisoned for violating a void
7
order has been held entitled to release.' '
In any event, when can one say that the question of jurisdiction before
the court is only frivolous? When is the court "merely usurping judicial
forms and facilities"? Mr. Justice Holmes, as is well known, said of the
doctrine of Swift v. Tyson: "I say that this is a pure usurpation founded on
a subtle fallacy. They say the question is a question of the common law
x66Ibid.
6738 Stat.

783

(x9r4), 28 U.S.C.A.

169 Rutledge, J., at 729.

§ 386 (x928) (italics added).
-69Rutledge,

J., at 726.'
170See Bessette v. Conk-ey Co., 194 U.S. 324, 330-38 (i9o4).
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''
and that they must decide what the common law is.
172 But the jurisdiction of a court, no more than the common law, is not "a brooding omnipresence in the sky.' 73 And particularly not when Congress, in the exercise of its constitutional authority, has placed definite and clear limits on
that jurisdiction.

In Thomas v. Collins 74 a denial of habeas corpus was reversed on the

ground that the statute under which the restraining order was issued was
invalid. The defendant Thomas had deliberately refused to comply with
the court order enjoining him from soliciting memberships in any union
affiliated with the CIO without first obtaining an organizer's card as required by the statute. The Court said: "We think he was within his rights
in doing so."'"T Why was not Thomas required to obey the court's order
and contest it on appeal? Was the order of the court a plain usurpation?
6
It could be, and at least Judge Goldsborough thought so.1
But if one takes the Chief Justice literally, one cannot be sure that he
will escape punishment if the statute under which the order is issued turns
out to be unconstitutional, despite the Thomas case. ". .

.

. We find im-

pressive authority for the proposition that an order issued by a court with
jurisdiction over the subject matter and person must be obeyed by the
parties until it is reversed by orderly and proper proceedings. This is true
without regard even for the constitutionality of the Act under which the
order is issued."' 77 And the Chief Justice cites the case of Howat v.
L ' T Now it is true that Mr. Chief Justice Taft used language in
Kansas.
that case which seems to support this startling proposition, but the
opinion explicitly states that the order did not depend for its validity on
the constitutionality of the statute, under attack.
Nonetheless, the sweeping language used here by the Chief Justice is
disturbing. It is well settled that a man cannot be punished for violating
a statute which turns out to be unconstitutional. Now just exactly why
should an order of a court have any different standing? Why should a man
be punishable for violating an order of a court that turns out, not to be
merely erroneous, but void-as much a nullity as an unconstitutional
statute is usually thought to be? 79 When we place these two propositions
17 2
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judicata principles have been applied to prevent collateral attack on determinations
of jurisdiction which were not contested on review. Stoll v. Gottlieb, 3o5 U.S. 165 (1938). They
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side by side, however, it is clear that the language used by the Chief
Justice, and apparently in direct contradiction to the doctrine of Thomas
v. Collins, is full of sinister suggestion. Assume a statute is passed giving
courts authority to restrain certain types of political meetings and providing as well for the criminal prosecution of persons who conduct or participate in such meetings. According to our present notions, a person who
violates that statute cannot be punished when on appeal the statute is
declared unconstitutional. Bitt what if a court has issued an order restraining him from participating in a meeting, pending a determination
as to whether the contemplated meeting is of the type banned by the
statute? Can he be punished for criminal contempt when he violates that
order? I would like to think that the answer is clear. But as the doctrine
of the Thomas case seems to have been modified, it is now apparently
necessary to show that the court was usurping its authority, that the whole
question of its jurisdiction was frivolous.
Nor should it be overlooked that where a court is asked to issue a restraining order it is being asked to exercise power. Is it likely that the
judge in most instances is going to treat this as a frivolous request? We
may be sure that some private employer will attempt to use the declaratory judgment technique and the Shipp-Carter-Lewis doctrine to obtain
injunctive relief in a labor dispute. If the length of the briefs and the
eloquence of counsel are criteria of the substantiality of the question,
nothing is surer than that the briefs and arguments will be imposing. The
question will be novel, never before decided, and the decision in the Lewis
case will offer pages and pages of brand-new authority requiring close
study. Let us suppose the first attempt fails, what of a second where the
facts are somewhat different? As any lawyer knows, no two cases are
exactly alike, and the ability of a lawyer depends in large part on his skill
in distinguishing them. Are these questions of possible jurisdiction frivolous? Can unions and workers take the risk of violating the order some
anti-labor judge is bound to issue as though it were nothing but "a letter
have also been used to qualify the notion that an unconstitutional statute is simply a nullity.
Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (i94o). It is far from obvious
that these principles should govern where the jurisdictional question concerns the power of a
court to issue a valid, binding order. If he is to review the order, the defendant must comply
with it. In the field of labor relations this will frequently terminate the proceedings, since the
defendant stands to gain from a ruling that the order was not valid only if he has not been required to obey it pending that ruling. Unions have a chance against invalid injunctions only
if they can attack them collaterally. Moreover, it requires some stretching of the concept of
collateral attack to apply it to a contempt trial growing directly out of the injunction proceedings. This is particularly true here where the line between the two was never very clearly drawn
in the District Court. For an excellent early discussion, see Collateral Attack upon Labor
Injunctions Issued in Disregard of Anti-injunction Statutes, 47 Yale L.J. i136 (i938).
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to a newspaper"? Dare they take the plain words of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act "so simply"?
With this incredible doctrine of the void but non-frivolous order the
Court has finally kicked over all the traces. The most skillfully drafted
statute purporting to limit the jurisdiction of courts is nothing but a
printed invitation to those courts to determine whether or not and to
what extent limits have been imposed. The fate of the Clayton ActS ° and
now of the much more carefully-drawn Norris-LaGuardia Act is all the
evidence that is needed. Once a court has been invited to decide, and while
it is deciding, the difficult problems of jurisdiction, it can issue such orders
as it pleases provided only they have some connection with the litigation,
the subject-matter of which the court feels its duty to preserve. To such a
power there is "hardly any limit but the sky."'' Its use need not be confined to any set of circumstances or subjects. The field of civil liberties is
no more immune than the field of labor relations. The Shipp-Carter-Lewis
doctrine can very well mean that "the liberties of our people would be
placed largely at the mercy of invalid orders issued without power given
by the Constitution and in contravention of power constitutionally withheld by Congress.' " 8'
The history of the assumption and usurpation of power by the judiciary
in America is a familiar story. But this doctrine, I submit, is as flagrant an
instance as our constitutional history provides. Contempt of court had its
origin in the notion that disobedience of the King's courts constituted
contempt of the King. 8 3 The flavor of long-discarded divine right which
has lingered around the concept of contempt has finally emerged as a doctrine-the doctrine that the Court can do no wrong. The Lewis case is the
ultimate in judicial power. It clearly says-"Courts are courts, and only
courts can say what courts shall be and do."
Ill
A large and liberal construction in ascertaining offences, and a disequity; which
cretionary power in punishing them, is the idea of criminal
54
is in truth a monster in jurisprudence.-EDuiUND BuRE.'
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The District Court was nothing if not candid. Judge Goldsborough even
remarked to defendants' counsel: "But if you know the exact difference
between civil contempt and criminal contempt, you are the only person in
the United States who does."'' s
In theory there is a difference, a difference surrounded by a "long existing confusion"', 6 which this case has only served to compound. A civil
contempt proceeding is for the.purpose of requiring the defendant to do
something for the benefit or advantage of the petitioner or to prevent his
doing something which harms the petitioner. For civil contempt "the
punishment is remedial and for the benefit of complainant .. ...,7, It
may be either compensatory, to repay the complainant for the damage he
has suffered, or coercive, to require the defendant to do something desired
by the complainant. A criminal contempt proceeding is for the purpose of
punishing the defendant for his actions or his failure to act in accordance
with the requirements imposed upon him by the court. The punishment,
therefore, "is punitive in the public interest to vindicate the authority of
' 88
the court and to deter other like derelictions.' )
John L. Lewis and the United Mine Workers were held to have committed both civil and criminal contempt, a judgment which was entered
in one proceeding. No serious effort was made during the trial to distinguish between the two charges, nor did the sentence imposed by the District Court in any way indicate which portions of the fine were for criminal
contempt, and which for civil contempt. No part of the fine was coercive.
The entire amount was punitive and, so far as any civil relief was involved,
compensatory.
Mr. Justice Rutledge eloquently argues that to mingle these two different procedures with different purposes into "a single criminal-civil hodgepodge",89 is nothing less than shocking. It ignores completely what he
calls "one of the great constitutional divides,"'' 90 the difference between
civil procedure and criminal procedure. It puts the defendant in the
impossible position of not knowing which of two sets of rules and safeguards are to apply to his trial, of not knowing "whether relief or punishment was the object in view."' 9' The Assistant Attorney General felt
compelled to say to the District Court only this: " .... I think the simple
answer is, since the complainant is the United States, or the people of the
procedural formalities or by traditional limitations of what are ordinarily called crimes, except
insofar as due process of law and the other standards of decency and fairness in the administration of federal justice may require."
x85
Record, at 191.
'8,
Rutledge, J., at 7331S Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 1ii (1925).
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189Rutledge, J., at 730.
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United States, that this contempt is both civil and criminal."' As an
answer this is patently insufficient. The government could not seriously
contend that all cases in which the United States appears as the civil
complainant become by that simple fact alone both civil and criminal,
contempts. 93 Nor should this dual role of the government "as 'employer'
seeking remedial relief and in sovereign capacity seeking to vindicate the
court's authority by criminal penalty"':94 serve to nullify the distinctions
between two different proceedings. Such a mingling was held by.the Supreme Court in the Gompers95 case to require reversal of the judgment for
criminal contempt. Here the Chief Justice observed only that "substantial
prejudiceA' was not shown.1 6
Nowhere was the charge described as criminal contempt in accordance
97
with the Rules of Criminal Procedure. This fact was conceded. Yet the
Chief Justice concluded that since the defendants in their motion to discharge the rule to show cause and in oral argument showed they were
"quite aware that a criminal contempt was charged," they did not suffer
"substantial prejudice. ' ' 198 This amounts to saying that since, being required to guess, the defendants guessed correctly, they were not harmed.
The whole purpose of the rule, of course, is to save defendants from the
necessity of guessing.
The Supreme Court tacitly recognized the error of the District Court
with respect to the fines imposed, since it reduced the amount of the unconditional fine from $3,500,000 to $70o,ooo, describing this as a punitive
penalty for criminal contempt. The balance was set up as a conditional fine
to coerce the defendants into obedience, nothing being provided for compensation to the government as a complainant entitled to civil relief.
Neither the District Court nor the Supreme Court employed any standards to justify the size of the fines. The War Labor Disputes Act authorizes as maximum penalties a fine of $5,000 or a year's imprisonment or
both. The net result in this case was to impose upon Lewis twice the
maximum statutory fine and on the United Mine Workers one hundred
forty times that maximum. If a statute imposing criminal sanctions can
thus be enforced by the simple device of bringing a civil suit for injunctive
92Record, at 196.
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relief and of "then convicting the person who violates it of criminal contempt, regardless of the order's validity and of any of the usual restraints
of criminal procedure, the way will have been found to dispense with substantially all the protections relating not only to the course of the proceedings but to the penalty itself."' 99 This is unlimited power with a vengeance.
Space does not permit an exhaustive discussion of the procedural
aspects of the case. Mr. Justice Rutledge properly observed that "at
times in our system the way in which courts perform their function becomes as important as what they do in the result. 2 0 0 The procedure here

seems utterly to disregard statutory requirements and constitutional
safeguards. The same must be said of the penalties imposed. In the
vocabulary of Mr. Justice Murphy, they are "vindictive. ' ' 20 One can
only hope that the righteous concern and sense of alarm expressed so
ably by Justices Murphy and Rutledge will yet be heeded.
One further point remains. The District Court ruled that since the
Norris-LaGuardia Act did not apply the defendants were not entitled to a
jury trial. The Supreme Court affirmed this ruling, conceding, as did the
government, that defendants would have been entitled to a jury trial had
the Norris-LaGuardia Act been applicable.2

Now on the view I have

taken of the actual mechanics involved in the Court's sustaining the judgment convicting the defendants of criminal contempt and imposing punitive fines for that contempt, the Court was required to assume that the
act did apply. For if my argument is correct, that portion of the Court's
decision affirming the judgment on the grounds that the defendants had
violated a non-frivolous order which was void as contrary to the NorrisLaGuardia Act is not dictum.
There is no point in repeating that argument here. But if the "alternative grounds" are essential to the judgment, and those grounds assume
"that the Norris-LaGuardia Act applied to this case and prohibited injunctive relief, ''203 then I cannot escape the conclusion that to be punished
as they were the defendants ought properly to have been tried before a
jury in accordance with the Norris-LaGuardia Act. I recognize, however,
that one sentence of Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion may serve to pull
the props out from under this argument. His final sentence reads: "I concur in the Court's opinion insofar as it is not inconsistent with these views,
and, under the compulsion of the ruling of the majority that the court
200
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below had the jurisdiction to issue its orders, I join in the Court's judgment. 1 204 This seems to say that although the Justice disagrees violently
with the Court's ruling on the Norris-LaGuardia Act he joins in the judgment based on that ruling, taking care, however, to dissociate himself
from that part of the opinion justifying that ruling. I concede that this
strange action may invalidate my analysis, although it in no way helps
in trying to figure out what position Mr. justice Jackson occupied in this
confusion.20s Mr. Justice Frankfurter appears to have been so concerned
with maintaining the dignity of the judiciary that he was willing to swallow a result based on reasoning he could not swallow.
IV
Though written constitutions may be violated in moments of passion
or delusion, yet they furnish a text to which those who are watchful may
again rally and recall the people ..... -ToAs JEr.ERsoN- 6
"We have examined the other contentions advanced by the defendants
but have found them to be without merit. '2 °l This is all the Court has to
say concerning the plea that the restraining order deprived the defendants
of their constitutional rights. The Court has repeatedly held that publicizing the facts of a labor dispute is an exercise of the right of free
speech protected by the Constitution.201 Yet here the sweeping character

of Judge Goldsborough's order effectively prevented the defendants from
saying or writing anything about their dispute with the government. They

could not say that in the opinion of their counsel they had a right to
terminate the Krug-Lewis Agreement, even though the legal merits of
their contention had not been decided by any competent tribunal. They
could not speak to members of the union, telling them the full facts of the
controversy and urging them to back up the union or to remain away from
work. And apparently, since the theory of the government's case must
have been that the miners were acting in concert with the defendants, the
miners were restrained from exercising their right to strike. It is no answer
for judge Goldsborough to say that "the miners are not in this case" or
to describe the greater portion of his order as "ancillary." Nor is it an
answer for the Assistant Attorney General to justify the breadth of the
294 Frankfurter, J., at 712-13.
"Mr. Justice Jackson joins in this opinion except as to the Norris-LaGuardia Act which
he thinks relieved the courts of jurisdiction to issue injunctions in this class of case" (at 703).
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order by referring vaguely to cases holding that words having the effect
of force may be restrained.09 The inescapable fact of the matter is that
Judge Goldsborough's order is infected with all the vices which characterized the pre-i932 labor injunction, including the vice of unconstitutionality.
The conclusion must be that government employees, even government
employees of the hybrid variety found here, have no constitutional
rights. Their loyalty must be to their employer, the government, right or
wrong. If they become involved in a labor dispute with that employer,
their rights in that dispute are too insignificant to bother about. This is
dangerous doctrine.
As Max Lerner has phrased it, this is the Labor Dred Scott case. At a
time when government enterprise and government intervention in business and industry inevitably are bound to increase, the Court has refused
to recognize that government employees have any constitutional rights
which the Court need protect. The long fight of labor to secure recognition of its rights to carry on the struggle with capital "in a fair and equal
way ' 210 comes to naught in the shadow of the sovereign. A more un-

democratic result in a world desperately in need of democracy could
hardly be imagined.
The means employed to achieve this result are unlikely to alter the
defendants' "total lack of respect for the judicial process. ' ' x Or to cause
many others to respect it. For the judicial process here became "a weapon
for misapplying statutes according to the grave exigencies of the moment. 1 212 With exasperating selectivity the Court chose what it liked and
ignored what it could not plausibly pervert. The words of Congress and
the words of the Court itself were twisted and distorted to suit the needs
of a conclusion. Virtually every point of law touched by the Court has
suffered. The clear is now unclear. And the not so clear before is almost
beyond recognition.
The doctrine of the void but non-frivolous order may well prove a
technique for government by decree. Fifteen years ago Senator Norris
wrote:
It is amazing to realize that in the last 40 years there has developed in the American courts the practice of writing a special law to fit the individual case by judges in
issuing labor injunctions; and that thereupon the judge, who himself wrote the law,
12

209 Record, at x85.
210 Holmes, J., dissenting in Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, io8, 44 N.E. 1077, 1o8i
(1896).
212 Murphy, J., at 717.
21 Vinson, C. J., at 703.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
has undertaken to prescribe the penalty for its violation and to punish the violator
without permitting the accused to enjoy a trial by jury or even to insist upon a trial
before another judge. It cannot be successfully claimed that the courts have not written
into these injunction cases a new law of labor disputes, fitting the law to each par21 3
ticular case, and then enforcing this new law made by the court.

The Lewis case reopens a vast area and suggests new areas for the making
of such special laws in whatever crises may arise to require them. A
government desirous of imposing "unity" on an "un-united" citizenry
could ask for no better weapon. The Lewis case does not authorize government by these special laws or decrees-it only suggests that their use
might be easy.
United States v. United Mine Workers of America is at one with that
imposing array of cases in which the rights and liberties of the people have
suffered at the hands of the judiciary-Dred Scott v. Sandford,21 4 The Civil
Rights Cases,' S In re Debs,2, 6 Lochner v. New York,27 and a host of others.

Great cases all, but bad law-incredibly bad law.
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